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Speculation over cyber war has moved beyond its initial poles of doomsday 
and dismissal.1 Some argued that ‘cybergeddon’ or a digital Pearl Harbor 
was looming, others that cyber war had never occurred and probably never 
would.2 The front line of the debate has since shifted to whether or not 
cyberspace has become militarised,3 if deterrence is possible in cyberspace,4 
and, if the security dilemma applies, how it can be mitigated.5 In strategic 
studies, the debate focuses on whether cyber conflict reaches Clausewitzean 
thresholds of violence and damage.6 Legal scholars – for example through 
the Tallinn process – are attempting to define when cyber operations reach 
the level of an ‘armed attack’ and ‘the use of force’, triggering conventional 
legal reasoning under the framework of the Law of Armed Conflict.7 While 
states have agreed – some with regret – that international law applies in the 
digital world as it does in the offline one, there is no agreement on how.8 The 
last round of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts failed to 
provide a consensus report in 2017, stalling the process to establish norms 
of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.9 Both the academic debate 
on cyber conflict and the international policy process to agree to ‘rules of 
the road’ are nonetheless built on the same premise: that cyber operations 
fall under the normative and legal frameworks regulating military conduct 
during war and peace.
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There are, however, good reasons to believe that the frameworks presumed 
applicable to cyber conflict are actually a bad fit. Two developments support 
the thesis that the militarisation of cyberspace may actually be the result of 
a demilitarisation of cyber conflict, as the main actors in cyber conflict are not 
actually military actors. Both the dominant role of foreign-intelligence and 
security agencies (as opposed to military actors) in cyber operations, and the 
use of proxies (either private contractors or other non-state actors) in cyber 
conflict, illustrate that, in practice, cyber conflict largely takes place outside 
the parameters of international humanitarian law. Other principles of inter-
national law still apply to interventions by intelligence services and proxies 
below the threshold of armed conflict. International law writ large is silent on 
espionage, but not on covert paramilitary actions or clandestine intelligence 
activities with disruptive effects. Many states use proxies precisely to render 
their potentially illegal actions deniable.10 Nevertheless, if state practice, both 
directly and indirectly, indicates that there are non-military actors and legal 
gaps in the cyber domain, the international debate about state behaviour in 
cyberspace may at least partially be set in the wrong legal key. 
Demilitarising cyber conflict? 
In the security domain, traditional boundaries between military and civil-
ian, and internal and external security, have long been blurring. The process 
has been especially intense in the cyber dimension. Lene Hansen and 
Helen Nissenbaum note that the internet has a tendency to blur classical 
distinctions deemed crucial to international relations and security studies: 
those ‘between individual and collective security, between public authori-
ties and private institutions, and between economic and political–military 
security’.11 Some boundaries fade through technological developments or 
deliberate policy choices. The latter range from mitigating the problem of 
scarce resources, such as a shortage of cyber-security professionals, to the 
desire of state actors to operate with a degree of deniability. Two fundamen-
tal boundaries in particular determine under which normative and legal 
framework cyber operations should fall: the boundary between military 
operations and foreign-intelligence – that is, espionage – activities, and that 
between state and private actors in cyber operations. 
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Intelligence and security agencies vs the military 
‘Cyberspace operations, because of their nature, may be harder to pigeonhole 
within the range of military operations’, write Gary D. Brown and Andrew 
O. Metcalf.12 This may turn out to be an understatement, especially when 
foreign-intelligence operations are contrasted with regular military opera-
tions. Foreign-intelligence actors are primarily concerned with extracting 
information, and building and maintaining an information position within 
the enemy’s networks (the long game). They face only national constraints 
on what is considered a legitimate and legal target. The dominant mode 
of operations is clandestine, such that the activities as well as the perpe-
trator must remain secret. By contrast, military operations are ultimately 
overt and are meant to display and use force against an enemy. These two 
models may meet in the middle in the form of covert action, in which the 
effects of the operation are visible to the adversary (and potentially the rest 
of the world), but the hand behind it is not. This creates room for plausible 
deniability, implausible deniability or at least confusion.13 To be sure, inter-
national law applies regardless of whether intentional interference in the 
internal affairs of another sovereign state is conducted by military or intel-
ligence services. State action is state action; it is simply tougher to prove in 
certain non-military cases. In such cases, however, the law is much harder 
to enforce. In effect, therefore, the legal regime for clandestine and covert 
operations is murky at best and most firmly grounded in national rather 
than international law.14 This indeterminacy is intentional: states are reluc-
tant to specify precisely how they instruct their intelligence officers to break 
other countries’ laws.
Many of the most significant cyber attacks discovered so far are the 
suspected work of foreign-intelligence and security agencies rather than 
military actors. Thomas Rid surmised in 2012 that all the then-known politi-
cally motivated cyber attacks were merely versions of sabotage, espionage 
and subversion – and therefore did not amount to cyber war.15 His obser-
vation can be taken one step further: in times of peace, these activities are 
conducted by intelligence agencies. The fact that some of these agencies, 
like the US National Security Agency (NSA), have some form of military 
signature or embedding does not mean that they necessarily operate under 
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the legal regime for military operations. Even those that are an integral 
part of the military operate under the legal regime for foreign intelligence. 
Other countries, like the United Kingdom and Germany, have chosen to 
embed their foreign-espionage and cyber capacity in purely civilian agen-
cies – Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Federal 
Intelligence Service (BND), respectively. 
There is a long and growing list of cyber operations, some labelled as 
specific Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) by various cyber-security 
companies, that can be attributed to different intelligence services.16 Stuxnet, 
sometimes heralded as the one cyber attack that reached the level of war,17 has 
convincingly been ascribed to the US and Israel by cyber-security companies 
and investigative journalists (most notably, David Sanger of the New York 
Times).18 The code was written by the NSA in cooperation with Israel’s Unit 
8200, but was unleashed – at least on behalf of the US – through the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 2014, the UK’s GCHQ was found responsible 
for a targeted attack on the Belgian telecommunications provider Belgacom, 
a rare documented case of one NATO ally running a sophisticated cyber-
espionage operation on another.19 In 2017 the virus NotPetya struck several 
targets in Ukraine, but the collateral damage to other companies worldwide 
amounted to $10 billion.20 A coalition of countries attributed the attack to 
the Russian Federation, and more specifically to the GRU, Russia’s military-
intelligence agency.21 In short, foreign-intelligence agencies, and not the 
regular military, are leading the charge in what is frequently mislabelled 
cyber war.
For both offence and defence there is a fundamental tension between 
intelligence collection and military (or policy) action. By their very nature, 
intelligence agencies lean towards keeping, expanding and deepening the 
information they possess, avoiding the temptation to use the intelligence 
and thereby lose the source. The classic example is the extreme secrecy sur-
rounding the Allies’ breaking of the Enigma cipher during the Second World 
War, precluding the operational use of the acquired intelligence in several 
instances. From a defensive perspective, the intelligence agency’s reflex to 
protect sources inhibits the process of attribution, especially the release of 
evidence to support a public accusation. In attributing the Sony Pictures 
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hack to North Korea in 2014 – the first public attribution of a cyber attack 
to another state – US officials omitted any evidence to back up the claim. 
Subsequently, officials acknowledged that the NSA had assets present in 
North Korean networks, and that they could not have provided evidence 
without compromising sources and methods.22 Nearly four years later, the 
FBI indicted a North Korean hacker who was working for North Korea’s 
main intelligence agency on the Sony hack and several subsequent cyber 
attacks, such as the WannaCry virus.23 For offence, the same forces are at 
play. In describing the military effort against the Islamic State (ISIS), Ash 
Carter, the former US secretary of defense, has expressed his disappoint-
ment with US Cyber Command, stating that they 
never really produced effective cyber weapons or 
techniques. When they did produce something 
useful, he added, ‘the intelligence community 
tended to delay or try to prevent its use, claiming 
cyber operations would hinder intelligence collection’.24 In cyber opera-
tions, then, having your cake and eating it is generally not an option.25
Most importantly, military operations and foreign-intelligence activi-
ties operate on the basis of different legal paradigms. Warfare has been 
subject to international law since Hugo Grotius published his seminal 
work on the laws of war and peace in 1625. Now International Human 
Rights Law, the UN Charter and the legal texts grouped under the Law 
of Armed Conflict regulate state behaviour during armed conflict, build-
ing on principles such as proportionality and distinction. By contrast, 
foreign-intelligence collection has not been regulated by international 
law, with limits provided by an undefined ‘gentlemen’s agreement’.26 The 
international norm allowing peacetime espionage is partially built on the 
1927 SS Lotus case by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which 
articulated an oft-cited principle in international law, essentially permit-
ting everything that is not explicitly prohibited.27 This leaves ‘don’t get 
caught’ as the prime informal rule and ‘everybody does it’ as the first line 
of defence when one does get caught.
Most liberal democracies have legislated restrictions on how their foreign 
intelligence can operate abroad, but other regimes are less legalistic and 
‘Don’t get caught’ 
is the rule
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give their agencies free rein. The use of force by intelligence agencies is a 
more complicated, and under-discussed, legal field. In essence, the nature of 
the targeted network already partly indicates whether the attacker’s motive 
is espionage or sabotage. The networks of political parties and government 
departments are considered legitimate targets for foreign espionage; this 
generates political and strategic intelligence. Breaching the networks of 
critical infrastructure such as the electric grid, however, generates no 
political intelligence. It does, however, provide crucial intelligence for 
sabotage in times of conflict – but also in peace. During armed conflict, 
critical infrastructure can be a legitimate target according to the laws of war, 
but this does not legitimise ‘preparation of the battlefield’ in an intrusive 
way. Passive reconnaissance using signals intelligence (SIGINT), human 
intelligence (HUMINT) or imagery intelligence is accepted as part of the 
game. But actively hacking targets and leaving implants in the adversary’s 
networks seem as illegitimate as laying remotely controlled sea-mines 
inside a port in peacetime. In doing so, the agencies step outside their 
own legal paradigm. Given the nature of cyber operations, more of these 
transgressions can be expected in the future. The use of covert action is not 
explicitly covered by international law, though constraints against it are 
implied in state-to-state rules such as the prohibition against the violation of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the principle of non-intervention.28 
Any physical destruction rising to the level of an armed attack, however, 
would be subject to the Law of Armed Conflict.
How to apply recognised international laws in a new domain like 
cyberspace is subject to much debate. Most cyber operations fall well 
below the threshold of an ‘armed attack’ – which would trigger the Law 
of Armed Conflict – and are executed by foreign-intelligence agencies. 
Does that mean they are all espionage operations, and thus not explicitly 
regulated by international law? This question will become increasingly 
problematic as cyber operations proliferate. Strategic ambiguity may 
benefit the powerful, but this advantage diminishes in relative value as 
others join the playing field. Furthermore, the debate about the nature 
of cyber weapons – including whether that is even an appropriate and 
useful term – has important legal dimensions. Both the procurement and 
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the use of a weapon are tied to legal rules and restrictions under domestic 
(military) law, so labelling something as a weapon has far-reaching legal, 
policy and political implications.29 
It may make more sense to describe cyber weapons simply as opera-
tions, characterised by what Max Smeets calls their ‘transitory nature’.30 
Cyber operations are tailor-made combinations of intelligence, intru-
sion and attack, and it is seldom clear where one phase ends and another 
begins. Moreover, the substance of the weapon is software code. This must 
be adapted and customised to evolving and unforeseen circumstances in 
the target’s network and the overall development of the operation. A cyber 
weapon is therefore very different from, say, a tank, and it is an open ques-
tion whether it should be subject to the same military rules with regard to 
procurement and operational use. Applying the rules – which would include 
reviewing all changes to the ‘weapon’ – might grind cyber operations to a 
halt. Not applying them would effectively keep all cyber operations under 
the label of foreign-intelligence operations.31 Neither appears an attractive 
option in the long run. 
Proxies vs state actors 
Foreign-intelligence services and military actors may operate under 
different legal regimes, but they are at least recognised state actors. The 
Westphalian state system legitimises sovereign states as the security actors in 
the international domain, formally excluding non-state actors. Even though 
the monopoly on the legitimate use of force – for both Weberian internal 
sovereignty as well as Westphalian external sovereignty – is still a relatively 
new element of modern state formation, its symbolic power cannot be 
underestimated.32 While developments such as failed states, international 
terrorism and private military companies have put cracks in this ideal 
vision of international security, this monopoly remains a fundamental 
basis of modern state power and legitimacy. As such, it underpins the 
international legal order. But actual malicious activities in cyberspace do 
challenge that standard. Across the board, non-state actors are involved in 
cyber operations, often in some formal or informal relationship with state 
actors. Such actors also vary in terms of political legitimacy. 
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Tim Maurer presents different models of the relationship between states 
and the proxies they use for cyber operations, based on the degree to which 
the state actually controls the actors conducting cyber operations on its 
behalf.33 He identifies three main proxy relationships: delegation, orches-
tration and sanctioning.34 In the first model, the state exerts the most direct 
control over the proxy; the last consists of only passive support, or even 
just the turning of a blind eye to their activities. As to legitimacy, there are 
various political models of the legitimate soldier that at the edges transgress 
into models that cover illegitimate combatants, such as vigilante forces and 
mercenaries. (These concepts are captured in Table 1.) Elke Krahmann iden-
tifies three types of legitimate combatants: the citizen soldier, embedded 
in political republicanism; the professional soldier, embedded in repub-
licanism and liberalism; and the private military contractor. The latter is 
legitimate up to the point where he or she does not engage in actual combat, 
the preserve of states.35 The citizen soldier runs the risk of turning into a 
vigilante, the private military contractor into a mercenary; both are consid-
ered unlawful combatants under international law. 
Typology of legitimate and illegitimate combatants 
The potential blurring of the various models of legitimacy and effective 
state control is obvious in the case of kinetic operations undertaken by non-
uniformed combatants. In cyberspace, where operations are as a rule covert, 
the provenance of the actor, the nature of the activity and the guiding intent 
can all remain unclear. Unlike the capabilities of tanks, frigates and combat 
aircraft, a state’s cyber capability is difficult to assess, and not easy to quan-
tify or compare. It is clear, however, that the United States, Israel, China and 
Russia are the ‘top tier’ cyber powers. But each sports a different model. The 
United States combines the professional-soldier model with a heavy reli-
ance on private contractors and private military companies. Israel combines 
Table 1. Types of combatants
Vigilante Citizen soldier Professional soldier Private military 
company
Mercenary
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the model of the citizen soldier with a heavy reliance on its cyber-security 
industry, as well as a revolving door between its military and that indus-
try. China employs a hybrid model of the professional soldier and citizen 
soldier with elements of vigilantism. And Russia combines a model of the 
professional soldier with vigilante proxies.
In the United States, relations between the military and the defence 
contractors that cater to its needs have been close since the Second World 
War. This military–industrial complex has, in turn, given rise to an emerg-
ing cyber–military complex.36 It consists of traditional defence contractors, 
now possessing cyber-security divisions, and a growing market of start-
ups and boutique firms that conduct work substantially but not exclusively 
for the military.37 Both the procurement of weapons from private indus-
try and the outsourcing of certain non-combatant tasks to private military 
companies are considered legal and legitimate. In cyberspace, however, 
state security agencies are increasingly contracting in private cyber-security 
services and expertise instead of sourcing out tasks and product develop-
ment. This modality results in public–private hybrids that operate behind 
the closed doors of security and intelligence agencies and the military. In 
cyber operations, especially where physical effects are generated, it has 
become increasingly difficult to define the ‘tip of the spear’. In the tradi-
tional framework of the Law of Armed Conflict, this has implications for 
the combatants’ rights and obligations.38 
Some legal scholars have argued that the nature of cyber weapons chal-
lenges the idea that one can separate the triggermen from others involved 
in the process. The complex nature of cyber weapons leads ‘states to use 
contractors with technical expertise to constantly modify the features of a 
weapon in order to overcome the defence of the target, thus blurring the line 
between the traditional civilian task of weapons development and the tradi-
tional combatant task of weapons use’.39 The Tallinn Manual, a non-binding 
but influential document, argues that ‘any civilian fighting in a cyberwar 
loses legal protections as a civilian’.40 From an international-law perspec-
tive, this suggests that private contractors may shift into the category of 
mercenary when the effect of an operation transcends a certain level of force 
and damage. The large number of contractors working for, and in many 
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cases in, the US intelligence community in cyber-espionage operations 
are even more difficult to place in an international legal framework.41 The 
Tallinn Manual 2.0, extending the potential coverage of international law 
governing cyber operations to peacetime legal regimes, avoids identifying 
the elephant in the room, stating that peacetime cyber espionage is not per 
se regulated by international law.42 
In Israel, the defence of the nation relies heavily on both society and busi-
ness. Universal conscription underlines the citizen-soldier character of the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Civil–military dependence also extends to the 
relationship between the military and industry. If anything, cyber security 
intensifies these civil–military ties as the country aims to be a central player 
in the international cyber-security industry.43 The famous ‘revolving door’ 
that is symptomatic of relations between government and the defence indus-
try in the US defines the cyber-security ‘industrial complex’ of Israel as well. 
According to the Financial Times, there are ‘few other countries where the 
military establishment mingle so closely with academia and business, to all 
three sectors’ profit’, and the IDF’s Unit 8200 – the SIGINT service that also 
conducts cyber operations – is at the centre of it all.44 The intimate relation-
ship between its veterans and the booming Israeli high-end security start-up 
community – combined with the strong tradition of reserve forces – pro-
vides a potentially powerful mixture of private contracting and a ‘whole of 
nation’ approach to cyber security and cyber operations.45 As Maurer indi-
cates, such a high level of integration raises questions about the long-term 
viability of norms that are built on the public–private distinction.46  
In China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has always been emblem-
atic of the citizen-soldier model, even though the organisation answers to 
the Communist Party rather than the state or the people.47 Three develop-
ments characterise the Chinese model of operating in cyberspace. Firstly, 
the activity and importance of ‘patriotic hackers’ have declined relative to 
the operations of state agencies. Prolific in the early and mid-2000s, vigilante 
hacker groups have been reined in by the government, while the PLA has 
vastly expanded its operations. Secondly, a marked shift has occurred from 
what GCHQ director Iain Lobban described as ‘industrial espionage on an 
industrial scale’ to more targeted and subtle operations, and on a much 
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more limited political and economic scale.48 The massive theft of Western 
intellectual property was temporarily stemmed by Mandiant’s APT 1 report 
in 2013, the FBI’s indictment of five PLA officers the following year, and 
the summit between US president Barack Obama and Chinese President 
Xi Jinping in 2015. For Xi, the public shame of the US indictment coincided 
with his own effort to reassert his control of the PLA by culling its business 
interests and ensuring its loyalty.49 These reforms prepared the ground for 
the third development: a new realignment between the PLA units conduct-
ing cyber operations and the civilian Ministry of State Security responsible 
for foreign intelligence. China did not have a long tradition of investing in 
foreign espionage, having focused predominantly 
on internal security, but has professionalised its 
intelligence acquisition in the last two decades. The 
PLA’s cyber operations have been consolidated and 
centralised in the Strategic Support Force to ensure 
better support for military operations, while the 
Ministry of State Security has been running more 
sophisticated APTs. As the role of the citizen-soldier 
hackers has diminished, the importance of the business sector, including 
high-tech companies such as Huawei and ZTE, has grown.50 As with the US 
and Israel, the public sector in China seems unable to function without the 
private sector’s cyber capacity.51 The difference is that in China, the private 
sector remains subservient to the state.
Russia has a long history of using proxies in cyberspace. The 2007 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks on Estonian websites 
involved patriotic hackers coalescing with criminal elements to conduct 
operations that were at the very least condoned by the Russian state.52 
Many links between cyber crime and the state have since surfaced. Firstly, 
Russian criminal malware has been discovered that incorporates espionage 
functionalities (Gameover Zeus), or was adapted for sabotage purposes 
(BlackEnergy).53 Secondly, there are several examples of criminal hackers 
being recruited as employees of the security services. Thirdly, as shown by 
the Yahoo hack in 2013–14 and the subsequent FBI indictment, political and 
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the broader picture whereby, according to Mark Galeotti, the Russian state 
has subsumed the underworld, ruling by decree when it can, and criminal 
violence when it must.55 At the heart of the intersection between the state 
and the underworld lie the nation’s security services, and it is no coinci-
dence that those that hail from these units – the siloviki – hold the reins 
of power in contemporary Russia. Although patriotic hackers and crimi-
nal networks are harnessed to serve the interests of the state, the Russian 
Federal Security Service (FSB) is deeply involved in hacking operations, and 
entities it has enlisted have been heavily sanctioned by the United States. 
The main APTs appear to be run from the intelligence and security services. 
The civilian foreign-intelligence service (SVR) is known for its refined espio-
nage operations (APT 29). The military-intelligence agency (GRU) runs the 
aggressive APT 28, its espionage operations frequently mutating into sabo-
tage and subversion. The hack of the Democratic National Committee is a 
good example. APT 29 had been spying on the organisation months before 
APT 28 intruded and transferred the stolen data to WikiLeaks, manipulat-
ing the US electoral processes.56 
The wrong track? 
In view of state practices in cyberspace, leading non-governmental organi-
sations, scholars and analysts may be on the wrong track in attempting to 
regulate behaviour. The key actors are foreign-intelligence agencies and 
private proxies. The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts did 
at least mention proxies in its 2013 report, stating that ‘states must not use 
proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts. States should seek to ensure 
that their territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful use of 
ICTs [information and communication technologies].’57 Foreign-intelligence 
agencies and espionage activities, however, were barely mentioned, and 
certainly were not made subject to proposed norms. A legal and normative 
process that fails to address the primary actors in a given field is not a viable 
approach in the long run. 
On the issue of proxies, two measures are crucial. Firstly, states must 
themselves review and specify the relationship between their military and 
intelligence agencies, on the one hand, and the cyber–industrial complex, on 
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the other. If distinctions between procurement and consulting, and between 
weapons and operations, are fading, new rules are required to delineate 
civil and military responsibilities. Secondly, the cost–benefit equation needs 
to be altered for states using illegal proxies to conduct malicious activities 
in cyberspace. Given that deniability, as opposed to the projection of power, 
is the main advantage gained from the use of these proxies, logic dictates 
that removing that advantage could alter the calculus of political utility. The 
trend in both Russia and China points to less reliance on criminal proxies 
and patriotic hackers, the countries’ intelligence services being primarily 
responsible for quantitative and qualitative increases in cyber activities. For 
both illegal proxies and espionage activities that deviate from ‘acceptable 
practice’, naming and shaming through attribution can change the calcu-
lus for the attacker. The idea of imposing costs to deter malicious actors 
from blatant transgressions of acceptable state behaviour, such as attacking 
critical infrastructure or manipulating elections, is acquiring mainstream 
traction. By increasing the cost of cyber attacks, the calculus for the defender 
may change too. If a well-founded and credible case of public attribution 
risks the loss of an intelligence source, that loss might be a lesser evil than 
the continued impunity of the aggressor. 
Finally, states need to address the issue of espionage. Intelligence agen-
cies have not only been responsible for a host of cyber attacks, but in many 
countries have also become the hub of expertise in cyber defence. The UK 
and Canada, for example, are making their SIGINT agencies the one-stop 
shop for all national cyber-defence activities, and many countries have 
embedded government computer-emergency response teams in the intel-
ligence community.58 Cyberspace has thus facilitated the diversification of 
spying activities beyond traditional espionage, with responsibilities ranging 
from the protection of government networks to executing offensive cyber 
operations abroad. States have traditionally been reluctant to address espio-
nage in international forums, privileging the freedom of manoeuvre that 
silence afforded. Over time, however, the widening gap between state prac-
tice and the putative legal framework is not tenable. States are increasingly 
regulating intelligence activities at the national level. Solving the conun-
drum of cyber conflict and intelligence would require them to restrict their 
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foreign-intelligence agencies purely to espionage. This is as unrealistic in 
cyberspace as it is in international relations. States, in general, are reluctant 
to unilaterally limit their own capabilities.59 
An international framework therefore needs to be considered. For the 
past 100 years, an evolving body of international law and custom has 
shaped and restricted military activities. It is now time to start the process 
for espionage. 
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